Adversary Techniques¶
Attack techniques mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, each written the same way: how the attack works → attacker commands → affected Windows versions → artifacts left behind (host + network) → detection (Splunk/Zeek) → response and remediation by Windows version. Every page links back to the Windows, Network and Splunk sections where the underlying artifacts and queries live.
Start here for mixed-version environments
Hardening by Windows version is the cross-reference: every control from XP / 2003 to 11 / Server 2025 in one matrix, plus a technique → control map.
By ATT&CK tactic¶
| Tactic | Technique | ATT&CK | Page |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access / Execution | Phishing → user execution (macro, LNK, ISO, cradle) | T1566, T1204 | Phishing delivery |
| Execution / Defense Evasion | PowerShell download cradles & encoded commands | T1059.001 | PowerShell cradles |
| Execution / Defense Evasion | Signed binary proxy execution (mshta, regsvr32, certutil…) | T1218, T1105 | LOLBins |
| Credential Access | LSASS memory dumping | T1003.001 | LSASS dumping |
| Credential Access | SAM, LSA Secrets & NTDS.dit extraction | T1003.002/.003/.004 | SAM & NTDS |
| Credential Access | DCSync | T1003.006 | DCSync |
| Credential Access | Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | Kerberoasting |
| Credential Access | AS-REP roasting | T1558.004 | AS-REP roasting |
| Credential Access / Persistence | Golden, Silver tickets & Pass-the-Ticket | T1558.001/.002, T1550.003 | Golden & Silver tickets |
| Credential Access / Lateral Movement | LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning, NTLM relay, coercion | T1557.001, T1187 | LLMNR & NTLM relay |
| Credential Access / Priv Esc | AD Certificate Services abuse (ESC1/ESC8) | T1649 | ADCS abuse |
| Lateral Movement / Defense Evasion | Pass-the-Hash | T1550.002 | Pass-the-Hash |
| Lateral Movement / Execution | PsExec & SMB admin shares | T1021.002, T1569.002 | PsExec & SMB |
| Lateral Movement / Execution | WMI & WinRM remote execution | T1047, T1021.006 | WMI & WinRM |
| Initial Access / Lateral Movement | RDP brute force, lateral RDP, session hijack | T1021.001, T1133, T1563.002 | RDP |
| Privilege Escalation | UAC bypass | T1548.002 | UAC bypass |
| Privilege Escalation | Token impersonation & Potato attacks | T1134 | Token & Potato |
| Defense Evasion / Priv Esc | Process injection & hollowing | T1055 | Process injection |
| Defense Evasion | Disabling AV/EDR/logging, BYOVD, log clearing | T1562, T1070.001 | Impair defenses |
| Persistence | Services, scheduled tasks, Run keys | T1543.003, T1053.005, T1547.001 | Persistence |
| Lateral Movement (exploit) | EternalBlue / SMBv1 (MS17-010) | T1210 | EternalBlue |
| Priv Esc / Lateral (exploit) | PrintNightmare & Print Spooler | T1068, T1210 | PrintNightmare |
A typical intrusion, in this section's pages¶
flowchart LR
P[Phishing delivery] --> PS[PowerShell / LOLBins]
EXT[Exposed RDP] --> H
PS --> BEA[Beacon / C2<br/>process injection]
BEA --> H[Foothold]
H --> ESC[UAC bypass / Potato]
ESC --> EV[Impair defenses]
EV --> L[LSASS / SAM dumping]
H -.no creds.-> REL[LLMNR / NTLM relay]
H --> K[Kerberoast / AS-REP roast]
REL --> ADCS[ADCS abuse]
L --> PTH[Pass-the-Hash]
PTH --> LM[PsExec / WMI / WinRM / RDP]
K --> LM
LM --> PER[Persistence]
ADCS --> DOM[DCSync]
LM --> DOM
DOM --> GT[Golden ticket]
GT --> OBJ[Objective / ransomware]
PER -.-> BEA
Read left to right: a lure or exposed RDP gives a foothold, the operator elevates and blinds sensors, steals credentials (from memory, disk, Kerberos or the network), moves laterally, reaches a DC via DCSync, and forges tickets for persistence. Each box is a page; each arrow is a place to detect and contain.
Pages¶
- Hardening by version — control matrix XP → 11, technique → control map
- Phishing delivery — macro/LNK/ISO → shell, Mark-of-the-Web
- PowerShell cradles —
-encdecoding, 4104 scoring, in-memory loading - LOLBins — mshta, regsvr32, certutil, BITS; parent/child and network tells
- LSASS dumping — Sysmon 10 access masks, comsvcs/procdump
- SAM & NTDS — reg save, VSS, ntdsutil IFM, HiveNightmare
- DCSync — 4662 replication GUIDs, DRSUAPI on the wire
- Kerberoasting — 4769 RC4, SPN enumeration, offline cracking
- AS-REP roasting — 4768 pre-auth type 0, DONT_REQ_PREAUTH
- Golden & Silver tickets — TGS without TGT, krbtgt double reset
- LLMNR & NTLM relay — Responder, ntlmrelayx, name/IP mismatch
- ADCS abuse — ESC1/ESC8, 4886/4887, PKINIT logons
- Pass-the-Hash — NTLM type-3/type-9, hash reuse
- PsExec & SMB — ADMIN$ write + 7045 service chain
- WMI & WinRM — wmiprvse/wsmprovhost parents, WMI persistence
- RDP — Type 10, 1149, bitmap cache, tscon hijack
- UAC bypass — fodhelper/eventvwr registry hijacks
- Token & Potato — SeImpersonate → SYSTEM
- Process injection — Sysmon 8/10/25, argument-less rundll32
- Impair defenses — 1102/104, Defender 5001/5007, BYOVD
- Persistence — services, tasks, Run keys, ASEPs
- EternalBlue — MS17-010, SMBv1 removal by version
- PrintNightmare — Spooler driver load, PrinterBug coercion
How to use these pages in an investigation¶
Start from what you observed (a suspicious process, an alert, a beacon) and read the matching page's artifacts table to know what else to collect, then run its detection queries to scope how far it spread. The response section says what to contain and rotate, and the remediation by Windows version table says which fixes the affected hosts can actually take. For the underlying mechanics — what a given event ID means, how an artifact is parsed, the exact SPL commands — follow the links into Windows, Network and Splunk.
Adding a technique
python new.py adversary/<name> -t technique — the template already has the five-part structure. Add an Affected Windows versions section and a Remediation by Windows version table to match the pages above, then add a row to Hardening by version. It appears in the sidebar automatically.