DNS¶
In one line
Almost every attack passes through DNS at least once, and a well-filtered, well-enriched DNS log catches a surprising amount of evil from the domain name alone. In 2026, though, encrypted DNS (DoH/DoT/DoQ) and ECH mean the network shows less and less — company DNS server logs + endpoint logs (Sysmon 22, EDR) are now the centre of gravity.
Reading order¶
| # | Page | Key points |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Understanding DNS — structure and records | Four server roles, recursion, TTL, A/AAAA/PTR/TXT/CNAME/MX/SRV/NS/HTTPS, subdomain takeover, domain hijacking, reading packets |
| 2 | DNS log collection and safe investigation | Sensor placement, pivoting to firewall logs, OPSEC-ordered lookups, the four detection steps |
| 3 | Domain signals | TLD, reputation, age, randomness (DGA), ASN, geolocation, rank |
| 4 | DNS abuse | Unauthorised DNS and its six traces, shared hosting, record tampering, DNS tunnelling |
| 5 | Blockchain DNS and IDNs | EmerDNS, ENS, gateways, EtherHiding, Punycode, homoglyphs, IDNs inside apps |
| 6 | Encrypted DNS | DoT/DoH/DoQ/DNSSEC, responding to DoH, DoH in Wireshark, 2026 collection strategy |
| 7 | Suspicious DNS triage sheet | Principles, per-field signals, workflow, false positives, corrections, common confusions |
Ten things to remember¶
- DNS only hands out addresses; the connection happens separately — read DNS logs together with firewall logs.
- A forwarding server replaces the client IP with its own. Sensor placement decides what you can see.
- The IP owner can put any name in a PTR record. It is a hint, not evidence.
- Domains and IPs are many-to-many and change at any time. Don't block shared (CDN) IPs — block the domain.
- Judge ownership from the right, by registered domain.
- Bad reputation is evidence; good reputation is not.
- Lookup order: our own logs → passive DNS → (from a non-attributable environment) a fresh lookup. Never
nslookupa suspicious domain from a corporate host. - Blocking outbound 53 does not stop tunnelling that rides the company resolver. The firewall blocks the path; the DNS server blocks the destination.
- Always decode
xn--. Mixed scripts + brand similarity. - Never conclude from one signal. Add who · what · where · what next before you judge.
Related reference pages¶
- Zeek dns.log — field-by-field
- Beaconing & C2 detection — regular-interval lookups and connections
- Windows event logs — Sysmon and Security events